http://aei.org/publications/pubID.28434,filter.all/pub_detail.asp

Analysis by retired 4 star general Jack Keanne.

Keane currently sits on the board of directors of MetLife, General Dynamics and AlliedBarton.

Iraq: Why We Are Winning
By Jack Keane
Posted: Wednesday, August 6, 2008

In June, General Jack Keane spoke at an AEI conference, stating flatly that we are winning in Iraq and that the momentum is irreversible. He spoke in detail about the four factors that allowed him to make this claim: the defeat of al Qaeda, the capitulation of the mainstream Sunni insurgency, the marginalization of the Shia extremists, and the improvement in the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Other reasons for his optimism include improvements in the political and economic situation in Iraq. Excerpts from his remarks follow.

I visited Iraq in March. I made multiple trips there in 2007. When I go there now, I spend more time with the Iraqis than I do with the Americans because, after all, it is about them. I visit schools, clinics, marketplaces, people's homes, tribal leaders, sheiks, insurgent leaders who are now working with us, government officials, our own generals and military officials, and, of course, our great soldiers.

Everything in Iraq is really hard. It has always been a challenge. Some of that will continue. But we can say with some degree of certainty that we are winning and that we have an excellent opportunity to achieve the objectives that we set for ourselves.

Those objectives are a stable Iraq with a government elected by its people, capable of securing those people while not being a threat to its neighbors and having a relationship with the United States over the long term. In my judgment, we are going to achieve this. That is a stunning turnaround given the disaster and crisis we faced in 2006 when we had hundreds of people being killed each week on the streets of Baghdad, when all essential services were shut down, when schools were closed. The government was relatively ineffective, having just taken office in the spring after the 2005 general election. The fact that this has turned around in such a short period of time is a remarkable achievement that will be studied for years to come.

Millions of Sunnis walked away from radical Islam, something that has not happened anywhere else in the Arab-Muslim world. It is a portent of better things to come. It is a major defeat for al Qaeda in the Arab world.

I was with the British chief of defense recently. Counterinsurgency has been the coin of the realm for the British to protect the empire for two hundred years. The British got very good at it, he said. But, he continued, the Americans have done something in Iraq that has gone past all the standards and norms the British achieved or set for themselves. It will take awhile for us to understand just what the Americans have accomplished, he said. There is some sense of it now, but it will take more study.

The momentum we have now is not reversible. So, we need to ask ourselves: how can we make this kind of claim? From a security perspective, there are four things that support it. All the data you see in the newspapers point in a positive direction. Civilian violence, U.S. casualties, ethno-sectarian violence, and Iraqi deaths are down. These data are telling in themselves, but they do not come close to telling the real story.

Four Reasons for the Claim

First, al Qaeda operations have been defeated. I said that in 2007, and I meant it, but no one wanted to say it because al Qaeda is a terrorist organization always capable of doing terrible things. But al Qaeda can no longer conduct sustained operations effectively. That is not possible. They do not have the infrastructure, and they are geographically limited to Mosul and its environs. By the end of the summer or fall, the residue of what is left will be eliminated, but what is left is no longer operationally significant.

Central Command (CENTCOM) will not say this, but it is the reality. And it is well known in the Arab-Muslim world. Al Qaeda talks openly about defeat in Iraq and how they have suffered. They are having difficulty getting foreign fighters to go to Iraq because it is a hopeless situation. In the past, foreign fighters would come through Syria and be picked up at the border, transported safely, and then safeguarded by the operational cell commander until they were ready to carry out their mission--either as suicide bombers or as operational fighters. Most of the time, they would not be impeded. Now, they are at risk from the moment they cross the border. They know they may not be able to carry out their missions. They may not even make it to the operational site. That is a demotivator for them.

Al Qaeda's defeat and what caused it are important to understand. The Sunnis were no longer willing to support al Qaeda. This is a major event in the Arab-Muslim world, and it has been underreported and underappreciated. Millions of Sunnis walked away from radical Islam, something that has not happened anywhere else in the Arab-Muslim world. It is a portent of better things to come. It is a major defeat for al Qaeda in the Arab world. We addressed this through aggressive special and conventional operations. What Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno were able to do is the second part of that story, and eventually the details will be told.

The second important factor is that the mainstream Sunni insurgency has capitulated. This is also under-reported in the United States. We have hardliners out there to be sure, but the mainstream insurgents are now seeking their objectives in the political process. They are no longer using violence to achieve their objectives. This is how insurgencies go away. Insurgents do not usually surrender. There are no treaties. They do not raise white flags. They walk off the battlefield and start seeking some kind of political accommodation.

The mainstream insurgents are now seeking their objectives in the political process. They are no longer using violence to achieve their objectives. This is how insurgencies go away.

I talked to some of the people who have been involved in this and asked why it happened. They believe it happened for a number of reasons. The most significant thing is that the Sunnis knew they could not win. They were fed up with the violence. One of the former insurgent leaders framed the issue for me this way: "When the Americans occupied Baghdad, they [the insurgents] knew there were major problems ahead for them." They realized that something different had happened as a result of the president's decision on the surge. I never looked at it as occupying Baghdad until that insurgent leader mentioned it to me, but to look at it from his perspective, that is what we did. And the problems they were having with their own people who were fed up with violence contributed, as did the number of people they were fighting: the Shia militia, the American forces, the ISF. They knew they were never going to be able to achieve their objectives, so they made a strategic decision to leverage U.S. power while we had enormous influence over the Nuri Kamal al Maliki government and to seek the best political accommodation they could get. That is a major event, in the sense that they have surrendered. We do not talk about it in those terms. We do not want to humiliate them.

What the media talk about are the Sons of Iraq, the ninety thousand youngsters between the ages of eighteen and thirty, 60 percent of whom are former insurgents who were fighting us. They refer to this as the "Sunni Awakening," and it is important. I do not want to minimize it. But it is a manifestation of the strategic decisions that were essentially a political decision no longer to use armed violence to seek objectives.

The fact that we have ninety thousand people who were fighting us at one time but are helping us now is extremely significant. Some say this is really dangerous because this is a militia-in-waiting with the potential to overthrow the country. I do not think so. First of all, we have retina-scanned and fingerprinted all ninety thousand. We have dossiers on all of them--their parents, their backgrounds, their friends, their neighborhoods. We have lots of information on all of them, and they know we have it. They are not the insurgent leaders; they are young people, foot soldiers, so to speak. Maliki will bring about 20 percent of them--a fair representation of the Sunni population in Iraq--into the ISF. People ask what will happen to the other 80 percent. Will they come back to take over the regime? That is not going to happen. The insurgent leaders know there is staggering unemployment in the country. They understand the issue. They know that a lot of these people cannot be vetted and become part of the ISF. Some have criminal backgrounds; some do not have the qualifications. The government does not want all of them in the ISF. There is a general acceptance of that reality. The media makes a big deal of this, but I do not think it is a big deal. There is another issue there. Maliki will start paying for all these people soon. We are paying for them now.

The third issue is Shia extremism, which was the focus of 2008. We are all aware of what took place. But they have been weakened and somewhat neutralized. Moqtada al Sadr has been politically isolated, which is a major achievement in itself. The Iranian influence in the country has subsided much faster than many expected. The weekend I left Iraq, General Petraeus had a meeting on Friday night with U.S. and Iraqi leaders describing the Iranian threat--the only strategic threat left--exposing its comprehensive nature in political, economic, diplomatic, and military terms. Within forty-eight hours, Maliki was running south. He strapped on his weapons and took three brigades. He is very impulsive. Petraeus could not stop him, but it turned out to be a good thing.

General Petraeus wanted to be deliberate about it--to set conditions, to get the agency and our classified forces down there to get tactical intelligence, and then to start building up to it. But Maliki achieved surprise tactically, and it was a major strategic victory for him. As a result, he has enormous political support from Shia moderates and Sunnis who never expected him to deal with the Shia extremism problem. Because he is a Shia himself, the Sunnis thought he would never take on Iran's influence in the south. The fact that he has done it has earned him genuine political support he did not have in the past. Despite getting off on the wrong foot, the Iraqi forces performed pretty well throughout the operation. When the Brits pulled out, there was a vacuum. Violence, criminality, and thuggery went up. There were two Hezbollah-trained battalions running free in Basra. When I spoke to the police chief there in March, he said 60-70 percent of his force had been compromised by a militia relationship. He told me not to count on them if the United States came down. He wanted us to work without their help because he said they were not going to be able to do anything effective.

The last thing that has helped so dramatically in terms of the security situation is the improvement of the ISF themselves. It has not been revolutionary. It has been a steady improvement ever since General Petraeus got his hands on the helm when he was a three-star general. He put together a program that had a foundation. The socialization process of taking a civilian and making him a soldier is not very difficult. The real challenge is training the leaders and the organization to perform effectively. All of that took time. When we knew we had to face the reality of a failed strategy, we doubled the size of the requirement. The fact that this was put on fast forward and that we were able to maintain quality was quite an accomplishment. It still is. General Petraeus has had two successors in that job, three-star generals named Martin Dempsey and James Dubik. They have performed the herculean task of helping the Iraqis. But the Iraqis deserve a lot of credit. There has been a steady improvement in their force. The last time I was there, I did not find an operational commander who did not make many, many references to Iraqi units in terms of the quality of their performance. This gives us tremendous confidence because they are our exit strategy. They are a major factor in the improvement of the situation.

The Political Realities

The political reality that enables me to make the claim that I just did about winning and achieving our objectives arises from several things. Congress and the administration browbeat the Maliki government into a national legislative patch, the so-called benchmarks. We insisted on eighteen benchmarks that the Iraqis had to accomplish. The rationale was that by forcing national legislation, political reconciliation with the Sunnis would occur. No one thought this could come about in any other way. So with the external push, the government accepted the responsibility. They have achieved all but two of the benchmarks.

The last time I was in Iraq, I did not find an operational commander who did not make many, many references to Iraqi units in terms of the quality of their performance. This gives us tremendous confidence because they are our exit strategy.

Let me mention two that were critical. One is the modification of de-Baathification law that now allows the Sunnis to enter into the social fabric of life in Iraq, to be part of security services, to be part of the government, to work as engineers or college professors again. All these privileges had been taken away from them because they were like Communist cardholders in the Soviet Union. People who held these positions were members of the Baath party. They were Sunnis and Shias. We took that away from them when Paul Bremer, director of Iraqi reconstruction after the invasion, promulgated that policy, and we have struggled to recover from it ever since. Take into consideration the political risk that Maliki took by allowing the Sunnis to rejoin society. It is similar to our civil rights legislation that took one hundred years for us to pass after the Civil War. That is what this struggle really is about--civil rights for the Sunnis to participate in political life.

The other critical change is the amnesty law. There are thousands of people in jail who will be free because of the amnesty law. Maliki knows this. He is going to put them back on the streets as a commitment to the Sunnis that this war is ending and that he is willing to let bygones be bygones. He has not had full agreement on this within his government, but the Council of Representatives passed the law, and the military is supporting it. There will be a vetting process. But this is another remarkable achievement in a short time frame.

Provincial elections are coming in December. These will be a major undertaking because they will change the government from a centralized Sunni model to a decentralized one. Everything from trash removal to running the universities to running oil distribution and production is now run by twenty-one central ministries. The Iraqis are now going to adopt the Shia model and decentralize. The provinces will have their own budgets similar to other systems around the world. They will decentralize and share power. This is a major undertaking, and it will change Iraq significantly.

The other political reality is that the reconciliation process took place from the bottom up on the initiative of the Sunnis, with the Sunni Awakening reaching out to us and to the Shia-dominated government Maliki was running. It is a significant reality. Initially, the government was cautious about it. You can understand that after thirty-five years of repression under the Sunnis. They have insecurities about dealing with this, but they have accepted the risk and moved forward. Reconciliation has been taking place for months. There will not be a ribbon-cutting called "reconciliation." It will evolve gradually.

Politically, Maliki is much stronger. He had no executive experience. He did not know how to organize or run anything. Many of the Iraqis do not understand the art of compromise. They understand the art of revenge. They resolved differences using violence. But how you work together to form coalitions or a council of representatives to achieve objectives is a new and huge struggle for them. But as we deal with Maliki today, he is strong, and he has support he did not have before.

Economic progress is slow. There are some positive signs. The currency is relatively strong. Economic growth will be around 7 percent in 2008. Oil industry production is back to prewar levels. Oil companies are coming back. Microloans are helping small businesses. Foreign investment is beginning to trickle in, starting with state-owned enterprises. It will improve. The U.S. Department of Defense had a great program there, led by Paul Brinkley, to stand up these factories so that they could employ more people. Unemployment remains staggeringly high--in the high 30s, low 40s. There are many challenges. A lot of suffering goes on in everyday life in Iraq. You can see that as you travel. They have a long way to go. But they have money. Most of the countries we have helped in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have not had money, but Iraq does. They will solve most of the economic issues long after we are gone. They need help from the world and the region and from us.

Summing Up

How did this all happen? First, the administration faced the truth that the strategy we had used for three years had failed. They did two major things. They changed the strategy and changed the leaders who would execute it. Both were decisive decisions that had dramatic effects. A new secretary of defense, a new CENTCOM commander, a new commander in Iraq, and a new ambassador were crucial. General Odierno's presence there was one of the great accidents of life--he is one of the best generals the U.S. Army had.

Take into consideration the political risk that Maliki took by allowing the Sunnis to rejoin society. It is similar to our civil rights legislation that took one hundred years for us to pass after the Civil War.

The new strategy is decisive. It is not just about force levels. If we had just increased the force levels and given them to the old team, things would have stayed the same. It was the change of strategy on the ground that made the difference, using proven counterinsurgency tactics that required more forces to execute the strategy. These new leaders were the very best that were available. Ambassador Ryan Crocker is amazing. The embassy had been dysfunctional for two years. He transformed it. People wanted to win. The malaise was gone. Crocker handpicked his deputies, but it took six months to get them in place. The State Department did not want to move them until summer because of the school cycle! And we were fighting a war!

The other major factor that helped to turn the situation around is the Iraqi people themselves. They were fed up with the violence, and they wanted change. When there were instruments put there for them, they reached out for them. You have to give the Iraqi leaders real credit, too, for taking the risks they took. The Iraqi troops themselves have improved.

The last key factor has been the performance of our troops. Their performance has always been extraordinary. When they had a winning hand, they became exponentially better than anything I have ever seen. I went in with the lead units in Baghdad in February. And many in the states were wringing their hands because there was concern that our troops were going into bad neighborhoods and that they would be vulnerable as a result. Our thought was that they would be safer. The security blanket is the people themselves. Once the people there knew our soldiers were there and willing to die for them, they informed on the insurgents when they started to come in and helped our soldiers in other ways. Our soldiers knew they had a winning hand, and they were very aggressive about it. They deserve great credit.

In terms of the way ahead, the big issue politically is the provincial elections. The political process is crucial. If we secure the elections, if we give people a voice, the provincial governments will all be different. Then there are the national elections in 2009 at the end of the year. They will produce a new government. Ninety percent of Sunnis in two independent polls have said they will participate in the provincial and general elections. That is staggering. They did not participate before. The 2009 national government will be stronger as a result of their participation. The election will represent the people. Policy and execution will be better.

We cannot squander the security gains we have made. Continuity is key. The administration has made a crucial decision in keeping Petraeus and making him the CENTCOM commander. He will not take that job until September when some of the critical phases are complete. General Odierno will be back in Iraq in Petraeus's job in September. These are two tough-minded, savvy generals who are committed to success. This continuity is critical to policy execution regardless of who is elected.

The next part about security is force levels. Everyone is focused on it. Two variables will drive force levels: enemy capability and ISF capability. I do not think the force levels will be that different. People will be surprised. We have had so much success, but because of what has happened in the past, they will be cautious about the levels. They do not want to squander gains that have been made. But the truth is that force levels will come down dramatically in 2009. We may be able to transition the mission in 2010. By that I mean that we would no longer be in the lead conducting significant combat operations. We will only be performing a support role. I do not know that for sure, of course. I would not have said that a year ago, but it is a real possibility now. If that is true, with the success that has taken place, the next administration will just be arguing over sequencing out brigades over certain periods of time.

We also need to work on regional partnerships. Other countries in the region have to get involved. The administration is working on that. We have to continue to check Iranian influence in Iraq. They are not giving up. We have checked it now. The Quds Force leader is savvy and ruthless. He has been in charge for twelve years, and he has a political, economic, diplomatic, and military strategy to gain a foothold in southern Iraq to drive us out so that the United States and Iraq are not allies. They will try to destabilize the situation. They will not give up on those objectives.

General Jack Keane (U.S. Army, retired) is the senior managing director and cofounder of Keane Advisors, LLC, a private equity and consulting firm. He is a member of AEI’s Iraq Planning Group.

Just as I figured. This thread has been up an hour and not a single post. Just goes to show one that all the Obama supporters on this site are only interested in bashing Bush and losing the war in Iraq.

What ye say o Fanta?
Care to critique the General?

"General Jack Keane (U.S. Army, retired) is the senior managing director and cofounder of Keane Advisors, LLC, a private equity and consulting firm."

heh

The assertion that it's a war, is a bit generous. The occupation of Iraq is a war in the same sense that rape is surprise sex.



No generalizations are ever true.

Since his retirement from the Army, General Keane is currently President GSI, LLC, is senior advisor to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts and Co. and advisor to Chairman and CEO, URS Corporation. He is a director of METLIFE, Inc and General Dynamics Corporation.

General Keane serves as a member of the Department of Defense Policy Board. He is also a military contributor and analyst for ABC News.

================================================================

Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand


To the public, these men are members of a familiar fraternity, presented tens of thousands of times on television and radio as “military analysts” whose long service has equipped them to give authoritative and unfettered judgments about the most pressing issues of the post-Sept. 11 world.

Hidden behind that appearance of objectivity, though, is a Pentagon information apparatus that has used those analysts in a campaign to generate favorable news coverage of the administration’s wartime performance, an examination by The New York Times has found.

The effort, which began with the buildup to the Iraq war and continues to this day, has sought to exploit ideological and military allegiances, and also a powerful financial dynamic: Most of the analysts have ties to military contractors vested in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air.

Those business relationships are hardly ever disclosed to the viewers, and sometimes not even to the networks themselves. But collectively, the men on the plane and several dozen other military analysts represent more than 150 military contractors either as lobbyists, senior executives, board members or consultants. The companies include defense heavyweights, but also scores of smaller companies, all part of a vast assemblage of contractors scrambling for hundreds of billions in military business generated by the administration’s war on terror. It is a furious competition, one in which inside information and easy access to senior officials are highly prized.

Records and interviews show how the Bush administration has used its control over access and information in an effort to transform the analysts into a kind of media Trojan horse — an instrument intended to shape terrorism coverage from inside the major TV and radio networks.

Analysts have been wooed in hundreds of private briefings with senior military leaders, including officials with significant influence over contracting and budget matters, records show. They have been taken on tours of Iraq and given access to classified intelligence. They have been briefed by officials from the White House, State Department and Justice Department, including Mr. Cheney, Alberto R. Gonzales and Stephen J. Hadley.

In turn, members of this group have echoed administration talking points, sometimes even when they suspected the information was false or inflated. Some analysts acknowledge they suppressed doubts because they feared jeopardizing their access.

A few expressed regret for participating in what they regarded as an effort to dupe the American public with propaganda dressed as independent military analysis.

“It was them saying, ‘We need to stick our hands up your back and move your mouth for you,’ ” Robert S. Bevelacqua, a retired Green Beret and former Fox News analyst, said.

Kenneth Allard, a former NBC military analyst who has taught information warfare at the National Defense University, said the campaign amounted to a sophisticated information operation. “This was a coherent, active policy,” he said.

Five years into the Iraq war, most details of the architecture and execution of the Pentagon’s campaign have never been disclosed. But The Times successfully sued the Defense Department to gain access to 8,000 pages of e-mail messages, transcripts and records describing years of private briefings, trips to Iraq and Guantánamo and an extensive Pentagon talking points operation.

These records reveal a symbiotic relationship where the usual dividing lines between government and journalism have been obliterated.

Internal Pentagon documents repeatedly refer to the military analysts as “message force multipliers” or “surrogates” who could be counted on to deliver administration “themes and messages” to millions of Americans “in the form of their own opinions.”

Though many analysts are paid network consultants, making $500 to $1,000 per appearance, in Pentagon meetings they sometimes spoke as if they were operating behind enemy lines, interviews and transcripts show. Some offered the Pentagon tips on how to outmaneuver the networks, or as one analyst put it to Donald H. Rumsfeld, then the defense secretary, “the Chris Matthewses and the Wolf Blitzers of the world.” Some warned of planned stories or sent the Pentagon copies of their correspondence with network news executives. Many — although certainly not all — faithfully echoed talking points intended to counter critics.

“Good work,” Thomas G. McInerney, a retired Air Force general, consultant and Fox News analyst, wrote to the Pentagon after receiving fresh talking points in late 2006. “We will use it.”

Again and again, records show, the administration has enlisted analysts as a rapid reaction force to rebut what it viewed as critical news coverage, some of it by the networks’ own Pentagon correspondents. For example, when news articles revealed that troops in Iraq were dying because of inadequate body armor, a senior Pentagon official wrote to his colleagues: “I think our analysts — properly armed — can push back in that arena.”

The documents released by the Pentagon do not show any quid pro quo between commentary and contracts. But some analysts said they had used the special access as a marketing and networking opportunity or as a window into future business possibilities.

John C. Garrett is a retired Marine colonel and unpaid analyst for Fox News TV and radio. He is also a lobbyist at Patton Boggs who helps firms win Pentagon contracts, including in Iraq. In promotional materials, he states that as a military analyst he “is privy to weekly access and briefings with the secretary of defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other high level policy makers in the administration.” One client told investors that Mr. Garrett’s special access and decades of experience helped him “to know in advance — and in detail — how best to meet the needs” of the Defense Department and other agencies.

In interviews Mr. Garrett said there was an inevitable overlap between his dual roles. He said he had gotten “information you just otherwise would not get,” from the briefings and three Pentagon-sponsored trips to Iraq. He also acknowledged using this access and information to identify opportunities for clients. “You can’t help but look for that,” he said, adding, “If you know a capability that would fill a niche or need, you try to fill it. “That’s good for everybody.”

At the same time, in e-mail messages to the Pentagon, Mr. Garrett displayed an eagerness to be supportive with his television and radio commentary. “Please let me know if you have any specific points you want covered or that you would prefer to downplay,” he wrote in January 2007, before President Bush went on TV to describe the surge strategy in Iraq.

Conversely, the administration has demonstrated that there is a price for sustained criticism, many analysts said. “You’ll lose all access,” Dr. McCausland said.

With a majority of Americans calling the war a mistake despite all administration attempts to sway public opinion, the Pentagon has focused in the last couple of years on cultivating in particular military analysts frequently seen and heard in conservative news outlets, records and interviews show.

Some of these analysts were on the mission to Cuba on June 24, 2005 — the first of six such Guantánamo trips — which was designed to mobilize analysts against the growing perception of Guantánamo as an international symbol of inhumane treatment. On the flight to Cuba, for much of the day at Guantánamo and on the flight home that night, Pentagon officials briefed the 10 or so analysts on their key messages — how much had been spent improving the facility, the abuse endured by guards, the extensive rights afforded detainees.

The results came quickly. The analysts went on TV and radio, decrying Amnesty International, criticizing calls to close the facility and asserting that all detainees were treated humanely.

“The impressions that you’re getting from the media and from the various pronouncements being made by people who have not been here in my opinion are totally false,” Donald W. Shepperd, a retired Air Force general, reported live on CNN by phone from Guantánamo that same afternoon.

The next morning, Montgomery Meigs, a retired Army general and NBC analyst, appeared on “Today.” “There’s been over $100 million of new construction,” he reported. “The place is very professionally run.”

Within days, transcripts of the analysts’ appearances were circulated to senior White House and Pentagon officials, cited as evidence of progress in the battle for hearts and minds at home.

Charting the Campaign

By early 2002, detailed planning for a possible Iraq invasion was under way, yet an obstacle loomed. Many Americans, polls showed, were uneasy about invading a country with no clear connection to the Sept. 11 attacks. Pentagon and White House officials believed the military analysts could play a crucial role in helping overcome this resistance.

Torie Clarke, the former public relations executive who oversaw the Pentagon’s dealings with the analysts as assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, had come to her job with distinct ideas about achieving what she called “information dominance.” In a spin-saturated news culture, she argued, opinion is swayed most by voices perceived as authoritative and utterly independent.

And so even before Sept. 11, she built a system within the Pentagon to recruit “key influentials” — movers and shakers from all walks who with the proper ministrations might be counted on to generate support for Mr. Rumsfeld’s priorities.

In the months after Sept. 11, as every network rushed to retain its own all-star squad of retired military officers, Ms. Clarke and her staff sensed a new opportunity. To Ms. Clarke’s team, the military analysts were the ultimate “key influential” — authoritative, most of them decorated war heroes, all reaching mass audiences.

Other administrations had made sporadic, small-scale attempts to build relationships with the occasional military analyst. But these were trifling compared with what Ms. Clarke’s team had in mind. Don Meyer, an aide to Ms. Clarke, said a strategic decision was made in 2002 to make the analysts the main focus of the public relations push to construct a case for war. Journalists were secondary. “We didn’t want to rely on them to be our primary vehicle to get information out,” Mr. Meyer said.

The Pentagon’s regular press office would be kept separate from the military analysts. The analysts would instead be catered to by a small group of political appointees, with the point person being Brent T. Krueger, another senior aide to Ms. Clarke. The decision recalled other administration tactics that subverted traditional journalism. Federal agencies, for example, have paid columnists to write favorably about the administration. They have distributed to local TV stations hundreds of fake news segments with fawning accounts of administration accomplishments. The Pentagon itself has made covert payments to Iraqi newspapers to publish coalition propaganda.

Rather than complain about the “media filter,” each of these techniques simply converted the filter into an amplifier. This time, Mr. Krueger said, the military analysts would in effect be “writing the op-ed” for the war.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/washington/20generals.html?ref=washington&pagewanted=all

Lordy, there's so much!!!!

How about you visit the site and read the info yourself crickster??

Here, A lot better.
Here's the tapes and e-mails the Times sued the Pentagon to get!.
An interactive link,

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/04/20/washington/20080419_RUMSFELD.html#

The New York Times Glenn? Definitely an unbiased news source that I would rely on. It is a rag suitable for lining bird cages at best. Glenn, pal, you surely realize that you will eventually need to agree that we have taken a stand where other countries haven't had the courage to get out from behind their Nancy little dresses, and that our military is doing their job...... and they are succeeding. Or you might just end up being an angry democrat that spends time trying to find fault with anything American, past, present, and future, on an internet dating site. If you feel the need to be right you can rest in this: being right about being wrong is still being right. I will check back with you once a month on this. Off to work pal, hope your Friday is a good one!

Get real Steve.
You cant deny documents the Times sued the Pentagon to obtain as being fake.


Even though the Times has publicly come out in support of McConfused, I would still not go as far as calling them bias.

Im surprised Steve, that you would approve of the Illegal war in Iraq and speak up to support all the confirmed, premeditated lies the Bush Administration has told the American Public in relation thereof.
Im surprised Steve that you would back these lies at the expense of over 4000 American soldiers and the grief of their families just for Bush and Cheney's personal self interests.

Im surprised Steve that you would speak up for these liars while they ignore the real wr in Afghanistan and leave those men to fight without reinforcements!

Im surprised Steve that you dont feel shame in supporting this criminal Administration! I would never have imagined you were one of the indoctrinated..

Glenn, we can bi*ch about the who's where's and why's til the cows come home but it doesn't negate the fact that we are there so let's get the job done and go home.The others have folded under threats of attacks or retaliation and have gone home with their tails between their legs. We haven't and WILL NOT no matter how much whining is done by the politically biased malcontents.Do I want our kids to come home? Of course I do. Your hatred for Bush clouds your thoughts and anger then rules the day. Let's grab some cigars and go fishing Glenn. It will all still be here tomorrow.

Fanta just can't accept the fact that our military has accomplished so much so quick in Iraq. Jack Keane is a remarkable savy ex general. What a resume he has!!!

Fanta, still pointing out failures of the past (Rumsfield era) instead of present day accomplishments. Still giving credit to exiled Sadr.

Jack Keane's analysis of current Iraq is the best that I've read to date.

Here's what your news media does to successs in Iraq.

Only ABC Runs Full Iraq Status Story After Fewest U.S. Deaths Ever
By Brent Baker (Bio | Archive)
August 1, 2008 - 00:38 ET

Not surprisingly given the past pattern, of the broadcast networks evening newscasts on Thursday, only ABC's World News devoted a full story to the fewest Americans killed in Iraq in any month since the war began. CBS and NBC gave the great news a few seconds before pivoting to full stories on the rise of female suicide bombers and the sexual assault problem in the military. ABC anchor Charles Gibson hailed:


[A] statistic out of Iraq today that is remarkable: Six Americans were killed in combat in the entire month of July. That's the lowest number since the war began. That compares to the 66 combat deaths in July of last year.

From Iraq, reporter Terry McCarthy proceeded to convey how “U.S. troops on the ground don't follow statistics. They follow their gut. And these days, that tells them things are getting better.” McCarthy pointed to how an Army Sergeant, seven months into his second tour, “hasn't fired his weapon once on patrol” and then McCarthy credited the surge: “The turning point was the surge, which began 18 months ago. Three months in, U.S. fatalities peaked at 119. Since then, violence has declined steeply.”

CBS Evening News anchor Katie Couric on Thursday didn't mention the low number of deaths, but she gave it just under ten seconds on Wednesday evening: “The U.S. death toll this month is nine, and that is the lowest since the invasion in 2003.” She quickly set up a full story on another Iraq topic, citing:

A new trend: Women strapping themselves with explosives, killing themselves and others in the process. Richard Roth tells us why female suicide bombers are on the rise.

Brian Williams gave the subject a few more seconds on Thursday night as he reported how “President Bush made an unusual early morning public appearance to talk about progress in Iraq” as “the number of U.S. combat deaths there was five” in July, “the lowest number since the start of the war.” Williams then jumped to a full report from Jim Miklaszeski on “new efforts to address sexual assault in the U.S. military.”

The cited five or six versus nine American deaths in Iraq can be attributed, I'm guessing, to counting only deaths from combat compared to counting those killed by any cause in Iraq, such as accidents, though I can't explain ABC's six versus NBC's five.

The news choices on Thursday matched the practice of ABC's World News always showing more willingness to highlight improvements in Iraq.

The MRC's July 21 Media Reality Check, “TV Keeps Pushing Bad News Agenda on Iraq; Study: ABC, CBS & NBC War Coverage Plummets; Reporters Emphasize Casualties Over Surge Success,” determined:


A new study by the Media Research Center finds that network evening news coverage of Iraq has fallen 65 percent in the past twelve months — a mere 429 stories so far this year, compared to 1,227 on the ABC, CBS and NBC evening news shows during the first six and a half months of 2007.

Rich Noyes, author of the study, pointed out:


To its credit, ABC’s World News with Charles Gibson provided the most even-handed coverage, with 34 stories focused on positive developments compared to 56 stories emphasizing bad news. On June 21, ABC reporter Miguel Marquez told viewers of big progress in Samarra, where the bombing of the Golden Dome mosque triggered major bloodshed two years ago: “Last year, U.S. forces here were attacked about 80 times a month. Since February, there have been a total of four attacks, a dramatic turnaround.” Two days earlier, ABC’s Terry McCarthy told a similar story of progress in the southern city of Basra, “a city reborn out of fear.”

My July 8 NewsBusters item, “ABC Sees 'Impressive Gains in Iraq' While CBS Finds Bad Hospitals,” recounted:


As was the pattern earlier this year and last, ABC's World News is much more willing -- than its CBS and NBC competitors -- to acknowledge good news in the Iraq war. On Tuesday night, ABC's Martha Raddatz cited "some really impressive gains" as she reported the plummeting number of attacks in Baghdad, falling from 1,278 in June of 2007 to 112 last month. The night before, only anchor Charlie Gibson highlighted the "upbeat assessment of security in Iraq today from Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen."

Neither the CBS Evening News nor NBC Nightly News mentioned Mullen on Monday night while NBC's Jim Miklaszewski only noted less violence in Iraq in contrast to a "record number of Americans killed in Afghanistan last month," so "if there's any bright side here...it's that the level of violence in Iraq has come down enough" to allow the military to move resources to Afghanistan...

ABC, CBS and NBC evening newscast coverage of the low death level in Iraq during the month of July:

CBS Evening News, July 30:


KATIE COURIC: Turning to Iraq now and more encouraging news about the drop in violence there. The U.S. death toll this month is nine, and that is the lowest since the invasion in 2003. According to the White House, car bombings in Iraq are on the decline, as is the number of male suicide bombers. But that has led to a new trend: Women strapping themselves with explosives, killing themselves and others in the process. Richard Roth tells us why female suicide bombers are on the rise.

NBC Nightly News, July 31:


BRIAN WILLIAMS: At the White House today, President Bush made an unusual early morning public appearance to talk about progress in Iraq, noting that violence is at its lowest level in more than four years. This month, the number of U.S. combat deaths there was five. That's the lowest number since the start of the war.

The President also made good on an earlier promise confirming, that starting tomorrow, combat tours for troops heading to Iraq and Afghanistan will be reduced from 15 months back to 12.

Meanwhile, there is disturbing news tonight about the number of women who are putting their lives on the line for their country and are facing attacks by fellow service members. From the Pentagon, NBC's Jim Miklaszewski tonight on new efforts to address sexual assault in the U.S. military.

ABC's World News. July 31, transcript provided by the MRC's Brad Wilmouth:


CHARLES GIBSON: There has been something of an oil boom in Iraq, where production has reached its highest levels since the war began. From April through June, oil production averaged nearly 2.5 million barrels in Iraq per day, resulting in $33 billion in oil revenues there so far this year.

There's another statistic out of Iraq today that is remarkable. Six Americans were killed in combat in the entire month of July. That's the lowest number since the war began. That compares to the 66 combat deaths in July of last year. As Terry McCarthy reports from Baghdad, no one is more aware of that number than the troops themselves.

TERRY MCCARTHY: U.S. troops on the ground don't follow statistics. They follow their gut. And these days, that tells them things are getting better.

SPECIALIST JOE TYLER, U.S. ARMY: I really don't have to worry about thinking, all right, I'm leaving. Am I going to come back today? It's more, I'm leaving. I'll be back in a couple of hours. I'll be able to talk to my family.

MCCARTHY: With the improvements in security, President Bush chose today to announce that troop rotations in Iraq will be shortened from 15 to 12 months.

STAFF SERGEANT VICTOR O'DELL, U.S. ARMY: My wife will be happy. She'll be very happy that the tours are getting shortened.

MCCARTHY: Sergeant O'Dell is seven months into his second tour. This time around, he told us he hasn't fired his weapon once on patrol.

O'DELL: Only for the range. That's a good thing, too.

MCCARTHY: The turning point was the surge, which began 18 months ago. Three months in, U.S. fatalities peaked at 119. Since then, violence has declined steeply, as U.S. troops set up bases in local neighborhoods, handed out reconstruction money, and lured many Sunnis away from the insurgency. Retired General Jack Keane was one of the architects of the surge.

RETIRED GENERAL JACK KEANE, U.S. ARMY: We knew that a counteroffensive would increase casualties, but we knew the net result of that, if it worked, would be lower casualties. And that is what has happened.

MCCARTHY: The threat level has certainly gone down. But for soldiers like these, who are preparing to go on patrol tonight, they still can't afford to let their guards down. Iraq may be quieter. It's not yet a country of peace. General David Petraeus is determined not to declare victory early.

GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ: As we have repeatedly said, and cautioned against, there will be further attacks.

MCCARTHY: But if the casualty figures continue to decline, the President and the General both hope to bring home more troops this year. Welcome news for those troops on the ground. Terry McCarthy, ABC News, Bagh

I'm ready for them to all come home Steve.
I have been for some time now.
I didn't start this thread, I just responded to the propaganda and naive assumption that we can win!

I was responding to not be naive as to the reasons for the reduced violence in Iraq.
ie., it wasn't due to the surge, and the overall picture is not as Rosy as Bush Administration or the military analyst portray it to be!!

Well Iraq was doing pretty good before we pulled the plug on them in '89...pretty much all we are doing is rebuilding what we destroyed in '89. Aside from that there are a few positive things happening in Iraq, but not near enought to justify the invasion.

From Iraq, reporter Terry McCarthy proceeded to convey how “U.S. troops on the ground don't follow statistics. They follow their gut. And these days, that tells them things are getting better.” McCarthy pointed to how an Army Sergeant, seven months into his second tour, “hasn't fired his weapon once on patrol” and then McCarthy credited the surge: “The turning point was the surge, which began 18 months ago. Three months in, U.S. fatalities peaked at 119. Since then, violence has declined steeply.”

see link in media story posted above

Now this guy has done a lot of reporting from Iraq and if he says the surge worked it's good enough for me!!!

MCCARTHY: The turning point was the surge, which began 18 months ago. Three months in, U.S. fatalities peaked at 119. Since then, violence has declined steeply, as U.S. troops set up bases in local neighborhoods, handed out reconstruction money, and lured many Sunnis away from the insurgency. Retired General Jack Keane was one of the architects of the surge.