Would you not just say that truth is circumstantial (taking into account all the variables)?

I dunno, maybe... Lay it out and we'll look.

Or do this a different way.. You try to rip it to pieces and see if you can

Why should anyone bother laying out anything for you when you refuse to lay out your definition of truth as a workable model.

As far as we can tell you don't even have one.

I can certainly see that as being a practical workable description of truth as well.

I have no need to rip into that at all. That's basically what we actually do when determine that a particular description represents a truth.

I'm sure there are several different ways that the concept of truth can be stated.

I have no clue why you are laughing. Do you think you actually know something about my position on Empiricism? Clearly you don't.

From the web site you linked to:



I totally agree that both dogmas they reference are indeed ill founded.

I don't even support classical notions of empiricism at all.

You are so far behind the times that I find it quite difficult to even communicate with you.

The paper you have linked to also is fixated on the analysis of linguistic statements, which they discuss in depth. I abandoned that foolishness a very long time ago.

If you are indeed familiar with the work of Godel then you should have some sense of the trappings associated with that sort of analysis.

Consider the following:

"This sentence is a lie".

Philosophers analysis this to death which is utterly foolish.

They take the stupid thing seriously and can't see the forest for the treed.

They view this as some sort of "paradox", but it's not a paradox at all, it's simply nonsense (i.e. it simply makes no sense at all)

It's simple, just look at it this way.

"This sentence is a lie"

What is a lie?

"This sentence"

How can a sentence be a lie?

It needs to have conveyed a meaningful concept before it can even begin to be evaluated for a truth value.

But what meaningful concept has been conveyed?

Well, if you attempt to 'objective' the term 'sentence' you'll lose site of the very meaning of works and go berserk.

So you can't do that. Instead you need to ask, "What is a sentence?"

A sentence is a string of words that is used to convey an idea.

Ok, fine. Then what is the idea being conveyed here?

You may as well state:

"This idea is a lie"

Then ask, "What idea?"

What is the idea that is considered to be a lie?

No meaningful comprehensible idea has even been conveyed in this illegitimate sentence.

So there is nothing to evaluate.

This is precisely the kind of foolishness that you will always run into if you simply try to evaluate arbitrary strings of words without stopping to consider if a meaningful idea has actually been conveyed using the string of words.

This is why a totally linguistic analytical approach is itself utterly futile and foolish.

So I refuse to even bother with the utter rubbish.

If you can't explain the actual concept that you are attempting to assess the truth value of, then you're just wasting everyone's time including your own.

And as far as I can see this is precisely what you attempt to do all the time. Continually.

I saw the flaws in that approach over 30 years ago.

So the article that you linked to has nothing at all to do with me.

That's where YOU are at. Not where I'm at.



I'm at the cutting edge buddy!

I've totally accepted the concepts of Relativity, not only in terms of physics, but in terms of thinking in general.

I've totally accepted the concepts of Quantum Mechanics, not only in terms of physics, but in terms of thinking in general.

I don't hold out for ancient classical views of idealized notions of absolute one-sided empiricism. And I don't try to reduce everything to the analysis of purely linguistic statements that have no comprehensible meaning.

I try to assess the WHOLE PICTURE in a way that is indeed comprehensible and meaningful. And that includes accepting implicit definitions because of the relativity nature of our existence.

That necessarily introduces an element of circularity. It has to, because that's what it means for things to be entirely relativistic.

You are still acting like circular reasoning instantly indicates logical failure, but that is CLASSICAL THINKING.

In a relativistic existence the circularity of things is innate. This is precisely what needs to be accepted if you are going to embrace a relativistic existence. You must start thinking in terms of implicit definitions and implicit descriptions of things.

I also accept the very similar concept from Quantum Mechanics that the observer and the observed cannot be treated as two entirely separate things. Just like with Relativity there is necessarily an element of circularity here. The observer and the observed cannot be totally removed from one another.

Again you instantly see this as "circular logic" and dismiss it as being fatally flawed because it's not Classical Thinking.

Well, I don't restrict myself to Classical Thinking anymore and I've told you this umpteen times now.

But for some reason you are totally unable to comprehend it.

I do not support classical views of empiricism where the observer is viewed as being something totally separate from the observed.

I do not support the logical analysis of pure linguistic statements for their own sake. That's a futile endeavor, IMHO.

If you have an understandable comprehensible concept, then that's a whole different beast. But to just analyzing arbitrary statements just because words can be strung together and appear to be saying something is total nonsense.

As in the example I showed with "This sentence is a lie". That approach leads to the totally fallacious idea that the term 'sentence' can be treated as a meaningful object in its own right, when in fact no meaningful idea or concept is being conveyed but that string of words that is being called "A sentence".

That itself is a fatally flawed approach to analysis.

You keep talking about understanding logic, but I don't see where you have a clue how to properly use logic. You totally ignore the paramount importance of the unprovable premises and axioms that lie beneath your so-called logical analysis. And you also totally ignore the limitations of the domain of applicability of various logical considerations.

You constantly speak of logical statements and conclusions act like they hold some sort of absolute universal sweep. That very notion right there is utter nonsense.

Every logical statement and conclusion is limited by the premises, axioms, and domain of applicability within the formalism that it has been constructed.

Yet you totally ignore all of that!

And you try to pass that off as being "logic".

Creative,

In short, I have asked you countless times to simply acknowledge that you are working within the confines of Classical Assumptions. Classical premises, Classical axioms, and Classical domains of applicability.

You continually refuse to own up to any of that.

Yet as soon as I start speaking about implicit definitions, and introduce relativistic thinking where circularity is a natural consequence of things, you start screaming,

"That's circular logic! Fatal failure! Fatal failure!"

No it isn't a fatal failure in a Relativistic setting!

It's only a fatal failure in your restricted domain of Classical Thinking!

We simply consider the world from two entirely different perspectives is all.

I accept the modern world view, and you're a classical hold-out.

That is the problem we are having right there!

Let's just confess that we approach these things from totally different perspective.

I accept the cutting edge observations of Relativistic and Quantum thinking, and you are a Classical hold out.

Period.

Then we can get along.

You state your views from a Classical point of view, and I'll state mine from the Modern point of view, and we can recognize that we are both speaking from totally different domains of applicability.

One who understands that Quine paper that I linked to earlier would not utter the words "truth value"...

Unless, that it, they are arguing for the analytic/synthetic distinction. If that is the case then they are diagreeing with the paper.

I would not say truth is circumstantial, taking into account all of the variables because we cannot know all of the variables.

Hows that?

Are you suggesting that we can know truth?

Is this why you saying that Tommo's definition has to be wrong?

Because if you hold out that we can't know truth. Then what would be wrong with a definition of truth where we can't know everything required by that definition?

Please explain.

Like discussed back on page 3(I believe) of the original thread, it does not make sense to set truth out in terms of "knowing truth". It is redundant. It would be to say, 'do you have a justified true belief of truth' or 'do you have a true belief of truth'.



I wrote that we cannot know all of the variables. It follows that we cannot take all of the variables into consideration. If we cannot take all of the variables into consideration, but we're holding that as a criterion for truth then we're doing two things...

1. Making truth contingent upon omniscience
2. Setting an impossible criterion

But you have already done this with your definition of truth.



Well, in order to know the correspondence to fact/reality in its entirety would indeed require omniscience of that correspondence.

So you've set up an impossible criterion yourself.

~~~~~

This is why I take it as step further (as do scientists and mathematicians) and bring it into the pragmatic world of becoming a meaningful concept.

I define Analytical Truth to be:

Analytical Truth - A correspondence between a description and a state of affairs where the description correctly describes the state of affairs insofar as can be determined.

This definition satisfies many pragmatic requirements.

1. It doesn't require omniscience.
2. It doesn't set out an impossible criterion.
3. It acknowledges its very own limitations and restrictions.

This is the concept of truth that is used by scientists and mathematicians.

In fact, this is precisely why scientists and mathematicians are always open to the possibility of their 'truths' being discovered to actually be 'false' or 'incorrect' as more knowledge of a particular state of affairs is uncovered.

They have it all covered.

You are the one who is demanding that truth be associated with an omniscience of the state of affairs.

That's an impractical definition of truth that can never be implemented in a practical way.

You have defined truth in such a way that you have set up an impossible criterion.

And this is precisely why you have not been able to produce a workable practical example of your model of truth.

It's not practical. It requires omniscience of the state of affairs and has indeed set up an impossible criteria for actually determining what truth might be.

You've just renounced your very own approach to defining truth.

No I haven't, you're setting it out wrong... again.





You're repeating the same redundancy that I'm objecting to.

That is to say, "Well, in order to have a justified true belief about the truth in it's entirety..."

To talk in terms of "knowing" truth makes no sense.

If that's your position, then what's wrong with Tommo's definition of truth?

Tommo never claimed that he could know truth.

All he did was give a definition for it which you rejected because you claim that he had set out an impossible criterion.

Yet, here you are proclaiming that it makes no sense to speak of "knowing" truth.

Well Duh?

Then what's wrong with a definition of truth that sets out impossible criterion for knowing truth?

I've already pointed out where that definition fails. It requires omniscience, and therefore set out an impossible criterion.

"Knowing truth" is the problem in your setting things out.

May I suggest that you read more carefully?

The omniscient impossible criterion is a logical consequence of setting truth out in the wrong way.

Truth is correspondence to fact/reality has no such consequence.

How much more carefully can I read?

You wrote:


It sets out an impossible criterion for what?

An impossible criterion for knowing truth, unless we have the power of omniscience.

1. Making truth contingent upon omniscience
2. Setting an impossible criterion

But your definition of truth isn't any different!

Your definition of 'truth' is:



1. Making truth contingent upon omniscience

Upon a full knowledge of correspondence to fact/reality.

2. Setting an impossible criterion

We can never know that, just like we can never know all the variables offered in Tommo's definition of truth.

There is no difference between these two definitions in this regard. They both require omniscience of the correspondences that they address, and they both set out impossible criterion for determining truth.

The only way that Tommo's definition can work in a practical setting is to simply take into account all the variables that we can recognize and determine and hope that we've got them all.

And that is indeed how we do it!

Verification

Truth is correspondence to fact/reality does not require omniscience.